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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case No. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through I 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
vs. 10854 
NEUMAN C. PETTY and IREV A 
G. PETTY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT FOR REASON 
FOR REPLY BRIEF 
The appellant submits the following reply brief 
to further clarify the issues between the parties and to 
bring to the court's attention precedent discovered sub-
sequent to the filing of the original brief. 
1 
, 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OR. 
DERING APPELLANT TO ANSWER RE. 
SPONDENTS' INTERROGATORIES WITH 
GREATER PARTICULARITY. 
The respondents have cited in their brief federal 
authority and a decision from the Supreme Court of 
California to the effect that discovery of the appellant's ' 
appraiser valuations of the property being taken by 
the appellant is proper. In answer to the federal autho;. 
ities, it should be noted that there is federal authori~ 
cited in the appellant's brief which is contrary to the 
cases cited in the respondents' brief. However, apart 
from the split in the federal rule, it should be noted 1 
that Rule 30 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
departs from the federal rule by providing that the 
court "shall not order the production or inspection of 
any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, 
his attorney, surety, or agent in anticipation of litigation 
or in the preparation for trial, unless satisfied the denial 
of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the 
d · · t" ***" Con party seeking the pro ucbon or mspec ion. · 
1 
sequently, the federal cases cited by the respondents 
are unrelated to the specific language applicable under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, in the 
Compilers' Notes, Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Ciril 
Procedure (Vol. 9, p. 559, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953), it is noted: 
2 
' j 
"*** In its report, the Committee, after dis-
cussing the various cases which had determined 
that writings obtained or prepared by a party, 
his attorneys, agents or insurers in anticipation 
of litigation or in preparation for trial were sub-
ject to discovery and other cases to the effect 
that such matter was privileged, concluded that 
an amendment to Rule 30 (b) was desirable. The 
amendment 'while placing the burden on the 
person seeking the discovery of the writing to 
demonstrate the necessity therefor, states a test 
of whether denial of the production or inspection 
sought by the party "will unfairly prejudice" 
him in "preparing his claim or defense" or will 
cause him "undue hardship or injustice." This 
gives the court a guide in determining whether 
tnquiry may justly be made. Tests such as 
whether the examination constitutes a "fishing 
expedition," "penalizes the diligent," puts a 
"premium on laziness," or is subject to a broad 
rule of privilege protecting all matter gathered 
or prepared by or for an attorney, are rejected. 
A client's privilege of free communication with 
his attorney is protected in that production or 
inspection is not permitted as to any part of a 
writing reflecting the attorney's legal thinking-
that is, his "mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories." Parties who have 
retained expert witnesses at their own expense 
are also protected***." (Emphasis added.) 
The appellant's position is that the discovery should 
not be allowed on four grounds: (I) attorney-client 
privilege, (2) work product of the attorney, (3) unfair-
ness, and ( 4) the interrogatories in part sought legal 
conclusions from the State. None of the cases cited 
3 
by the respondent. co.ver the work product issue under 
rules or statutes sumlar to that existing in Utah 
. . , nor 
do they consider the question of the legal conclusionarr 
status of the request for information. Respondent seeks 
to rely upon Oceanside Union School District of San 
Diego County v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 
23 Cal. Rep. 37 5, 373 P .2d 439 ( 1962). That case con-
sidered only the attorney-client privilege and did not 
consider the work product argument. Further, the 
California Code of Civil Procedure does not contain 
provisions similar to Rule 30 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. It is submitted that the better-reasoned 
approach is that contained in Rust v. Roberts, 171 Cal. 
App.2d 772, 341 P.2d 46 (1959). 
The same issue now before the court was before the 
Oregon Supreme Court in Brink v. Multnomah County, 
224 Ore. 507, 356 P .2d 536 ( 1960) . There, the Oregon 
Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege 
prohibited discovery of an appraiser employed by the 
condemnor. The court also indicated: 
"It is possible that plaintiffs' demand for the 
information contained in its report could have 
been resisted by defendant's counsel on th~ 
ground that it was a part of his '":ork-p~oduct 
arising out of his preparation for trial. Hickman 
v. Taylor, 1947, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, ~I 
L.Ed. 451, instructive opinion below reported ID 
a Cir., 1945, 153 F.2d 212, 223; Sparks C~ ~· 
Huber Baking Co., 1955, IO Terry .267, 49 ~o 
267, II4 A.2d 657; McCormick, Evidence,~ 1 
(1954)." 
4 
The Oregon Supreme Court applied the attorney-client 
privilege, citing McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F.Supp. 585 
(D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1939), that to make use of such prep-
aration would be to "penalize the diligent and place a 
premium on laziness." The court also noted a similar 
result in the case of Lewis v. United Airlines Transport 
Corporation, 32 F. Supp. 21 (D.C.W.D. Penn. 1940). 
In State Highway Department v. 62.96747 Acres 
of Land, 193 A.2d 799 (Del. 1963), the Delaware court 
ruled that a party could not use the expert appraisers 
of the State or discover their testimony. In doing so, 
the court thoroughly considered precedent from Cali-
fornia. The court noted that it was difficult to reconcile 
the decisions of the California Supreme Court. It further 
noted that there was substantial inaccuracy in much of 
the legal research of the California Court, and incon-
sistency among the California authorities. The Delaware 
court approved the opinion of the Oregon Supreme 
Court noted above, rejected the California authorities, 
and indicated that the attorney-client privilege was ap-
plicable to appraisers hired by the State Highway 
Department. 
It is apparent that the better rule is to recognize 
that experts expressly employed by the Utah State 
Department of Highways are employed for the purpose 
of litigation, and appraisals are communicated to the 
State's attorneys for the sole purpose of litigation. By 
keeping the appraisals of the parties to themselves, 
justice is served, and settlement of suits is encouraged, 
5 
l 
since a party not knowing the State's appraisals will 
not be in a position to shop for higher appraisals, but 
will be forced to make an objective appraisal of his 
position based on his own determination of value. If 
discovery were allowed, it would produce "appraiser 
shopping." A party would be inclined to discover the 
State's appraisals and then seek out higher appraisals 
merely for the purpose of claiming a greater damage. 
The traditional condemnation practice has been to ex-
clude discovery, and it does not appear to have pre-
judiced the community. In the case of a clear showing 
that the condemnee would be prejudiced, a court might, 
in its discretion, allow some discovery, but blanket dis-
covery which was sought in this case and which. in part, 
called for the legal conclusions of the State is improper. ~ 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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